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Abstract	
	In	 this	 paper	 I	 consider	 how	 the	 increase	 of	 Public-Private	 Partnerships	 (P3s)	 in	 Canada	 now	threatens	the	autonomy	of	municipal	water	services.	P3s	have	gained	traction	since	the	1990s	as	a	mechanism	of	private	alternative	service	delivery	that	replace	traditional	public	provision.	Over	the	past	decade,	P3s	have	been	actively	promoted	by	the	state	via	quasi-government	agencies	such	as	Public-Private	Partnerships	Canada	(PPP	Canada),	yet	their	results	have	been	markedly	poor.	Nev-ertheless,	P3s	are	now	being	situated	as	a	key	mechanism	in	the	neoliberal	(re)regulation	of	public	services,	regardless	of	their	shortcomings	and	inequities.	With	this	in	mind,	I	frame	recent	Federal	policy	changes	concerning	 the	 funding	of	 local	water	 infrastructure	and	services	and	 their	 imple-mentation	through	such	agencies	as	PPP	Canada	as	expressions	of	post-political	governance	in	Can-ada.	I	argue	that	the	capacity	for	local	decision-making	concerning	this	integral	social	and	ecological	service	 is	being	overwhelmed	by	a	 technocratic,	expert-driven	political	process	 that	 is	contingent	on	the	hegemony	of	economic	austerity	to	institute	municipal	water	privatization,	free	from	demo-cratic	accountability.			
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Introduction	
	 Reeling	from	decades	of	‘state	failure’,	public	water	services	around	the	world	have	experienced	neoliberal	privatization	of	varying	degrees	(Bakker,	2013;	Peck,	2010a),	bringing	their	operations	in	 line	with	the	market-centric	rationality	(Brown,	2015)	that	now	so	commonly	informs	contem-porary	environmental	governance	(Bakker,	2014;	Heynen	et	al.,	2007).	Globally,	the	outcome	of	this	recalibration	in	governance	has	been	socially	and	ecologically	detrimental	(see	Bakker,	2010),	with	Canadian	municipal	water	services	also	suffering	this	fate.	The	political-economic	climate	in	Canada	is	now	set	to	exacerbate	this.	At	first	glance,	this	invocation	of	predetermination	might	seem	unsuitable	–	are	the	routine	out-comes	of	water	service	marketization,	such	as	commercialization	and	privatization	(Bakker,	2014,	2003),	really	beyond	democratic	control?	Can	we	not	challenge	this	overflow	of	‘displacement’,	this	commodification	(Castree,	2003;	Harvey,	2004,	p.	64)–	is	there	really	no	alternative	to	the	process-es	of	neoliberalization?	These	questions	aside,	the	language	above	is	certainly	intentional,	meant	to	invoke	a	sense	of	concern	about	the	trajectories	of	water	privatization	and	the	capacities	of	political	will	for	opposing	them.		Karen	Bakker	(2013)	recently	argues	that	we	are	witnessing	a	refined	intensification	of	neolib-eral	water	governance	around	the	world	–	one	characteristically	variegated	in	form,	albeit	uniform-ly	 ‘non-public’	 in	 expression.	 Bakker	 states	 that	while	 outright,	 ‘traditional’	 privatization	 has	 de-clined,	new	articulations	have	emerged	that	are	still	neoliberal	in	spirit;	that	“neoliberalization	[is]	producing	its	others	or	a	means	by	which	states	devolve	responsibility	for	services	to	certain	clas-ses	or	groups	of	citizens”	(2013,	p.	257),	namely	 those	 in	 the	private,	or	corporate	sector.	As	 this	
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paper	seeks	to	demonstrate,	this	process	is	occurring	in	Canada	under	the	guise	of	‘economic	pros-perity’,	and	via	the	benefits	afforded	through	public-private	partnerships	(P3s).		P3s	have	grown	in	popularity	since	the	mid-1980s	as	an	alternative	to	traditional	municipal	ser-vice	provision.	Generally,	aside	from	secondary	tasks	where	private	firms	are	required	for	specific	and	limited	roles,	‘public’	water	typically	relies	on	financing	and	labour	that	are	sourced	in	house	by	sub-federal	governments.	P3s	are	distinct	from	this	arrangement,	however,	because	they	allow	pri-vate	 firms	 to	 control	 publicly-owned	 projects	 at	 all	 stages,	 and	 therefore	 to	 incorporate	 market	mechanisms	at	a	much	greater	degree	(Loxley,	2010).	Historically,	P3s	have	been	commonly	been	used	 for	 large	 infrastructure	projects	 in	 the	 transportation	 sector	 (for	 roadways	 and	bridges),	 in	healthcare	(for	the	creation	of	new	hospitals),	and,	more	recently,	in	municipal	water	treatment	and	delivery.	According	 to	 Loxley	 (2012),	 200	P3s	were	planned	or	 implemented	 in	Canada	between	1985	and	2001,	valued	at	over	US$71	billion.	To	date,	all	levels	of	government	in	Canada	have	en-gaged	in	some	form	of	P3	in	the	past	fifteen	years	(Loxley,	2010,	p.	4),	with	a	substantial	increase	since	the	economic	crisis	of	2008	(Lang,	2013).		During	this	period,	I	argue,	the	Canadian	waterscape	has	been	transformed,	through	a	common	sense	adherence	to	austere	economic	policy	and	the	expansion	of	private	stakeholder	involvement	in	decision-making,	into	a	waterscape	where	local	governments	will	have	little	to	no	input	–	no	po-litical	capacity	–	to	decide	how	to	finance	or	provide	water	to	their	constituents.	Therefore,	answer-ing	the	questions	posed	above	–	questions	concerning	the	force	of	marketization	and	control	over	water	services	–	requires	engagement	with	a	political-economic	analysis	of	Canadian	water	govern-ance	that	problematizes	the	mechanisms	through	which	both	responsibility	and	authority	for	water	services	are	availed,	and	the	forms	of	so-called	‘public’	provision	that	result.	With	attention	to	these	mechanisms	–	primarily	the	government	discourse	concerning	the	so-called	‘need’	for	P3	privatiza-tion,	and	subsequent	policies	used	to	normalize	 it	–	we	can	observe	an	overly	pragmatic	and	eco-nomically	driven	form	of	neoliberal,	post-political	water	governance	developing	in	Canada.	
	
Neoliberalism	in	Brief		 Neoliberalism	is	commonly	understood	as	a	political-economic	philosophy	heralding	individual	freedom,	 liberty,	 and	 unimpeded	 economic	 development	 as	 central	 tenets	 of	 collective	 progress.	The	 ‘neo’	 in	 neoliberalism	 infers	 a	 resurgence	 of	 this	 perspective	 from	 classical	 liberal	 economic	beliefs	of	philosophers	like	Adam	Smith	and	David	Ricardo,	who	further	espoused	the	centrality	of	property	rights	and	autonomy	as	key	facets	of	social	progress.	Thus,	neoliberalism	begins	from	the	position	that	 freedom	from	state	 intervention	will	safeguard	 individual	 liberties	 from	within	capi-
talism,	 and	 is	grounded	 in	an	overall	 recognition	of	 the	virtues	of	 the	market	–	and	 therefore	 the	inabilities	 of	 the	 state	 –	 in	 managing	 economic	 development.	 This	 promise	 is	 carried	 forwards	through	 ‘common-sense’	 rationalization	(Brown	2015;	Harvey	2005)	and	discursive	reproduction	(Springer	 2013)	 that	 act	 to	 legitimize	 the	 material	 processes	 of	 neoliberalization	 (England	 and	Ward	2007),	and	vice-versa.	For	as	Marx	stated	in	his	account	of	the	base-superstructure	relation-ship	under	capitalism,	 “the	mode	of	production	of	material	 life	conditions	 the	social,	political	and	intellectual	life	process	in	general”	(1993,	n.p.).	As	such,	the	ideological	merits	of	neoliberal	capital-ism	 are	 reproduced	 through	 state-led	 initiatives	 like	 trade	 liberalization,	 economic	 deregulation,	and	of	course,	public	service	and	asset	privatization.		As	David	Harvey	(2005)	showed	over	a	decade	ago,	the	U.S	was	a	global	 leader	in	diasporizing	neoliberalism	practices	via	its	support	of	transnational	financial	activities	engineered	to	ameliorate	the	economic	hardships	faced	by	developing	economies	through	the	latter	decades	of	the	21st	cen-tury,	while	simultaneously	ensuring	 the	permeability	of	 such	spaces	 to	corporate	capital	 (Woods,	2006).	 This	 process	 has	 been	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘accumulation	 by	 dispossession’	 (Harvey,	 2007),	whereby	public	assets	are	transferred	to	the	private	sector,	often	at	well	below	their	real	value,	and	can	 then	 provide	 a	 ‘spatio-temporal	 fix’	 (Harvey,	 2001)	 against	 circulatory	 devaluation	 or	 other	
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vulnerabilities	 brought	 about	 through	 the	 inherent	 contradictions	 of	 capitalism.	Thus,	 for	 the	 ar-gument	unfolding	here,	neoliberalization	is	recognized	first	and	foremost	as	an	accumulation	pro-ject,	contingent	on	the	re-formulation	of	public,	or	common	spaces	into	entities	which	are	amenable	to	techniques	of	market-based	governance1.		
Post-Political	Neoliberalism			 Since	 the	 “unabashed	victory	of	 economic	 and	political	 liberalism”	 (Fukuyama,	 1989,	 n.p)	 and	the	successes	of	neoliberalism,	democracy	has	 taken	a	back	seat	 to	 the	prioritization	of	economic	growth,	making	(or	sacrificing)	space	to	what	have	been	termed	‘post-democratic’	or	‘post-political’	governance	 (Crouch,	 2004;	 Swyngedouw,	 2009,	 2010,	 2011;	 Wilson	 and	 Swyngedouw,	 2014a;	Žižek,	1999).	Wilson	and	Swyngedouw	(2014b)	summarize	this	as	“a	situation	in	which	the	politi-cal	–	understood	as	a	space	of	contestation	and	agonistic	engagement	–	is	increasingly	colonised	by	politics	–	understood	as	 technocratic	mechanisms	and	consensual	procedures	 that	operate	within	an	unquestioned	framework	of	representative	democracy,	free	market	economics,	and	cosmopoli-tan	liberalism”	(6).	Although	the	philosophic	roots	of	this	view	are	not	a	primary	focus	here,2	those	who	have	influenced	the	literature	on	post-politics	like	Jacques	Rancière,	Slavoj	Žižek,	and	Chantal	Mouffe	arguably	share	similar	end	goals	targeting	increased	democracy	and	egalitarian,	emancipa-tory	politics.	As	such,	the	disciplinary	range	occupied	by	these	thinkers	provides	much	flexibility	in	using	post-politics	as	an	analytic	tool,	which	in	part	explains	its	recent	surge	in	attention	(e.g.	Wil-son	and	Swyngedouw,	2014b),	and	its	application	here.		Indeed,	one	only	has	to	look	to	the	current	state	of	contemporary	econo-centric,	 individualistic	politics	(Brown,	2015)	to	realize	the	timeliness	of	a	theoretical	lens	that	posits	the	partial	foreclo-sure	of	democratic	potentiality,	the	“disappearance	of	politics”	(Rancière,	1999,	p.	102),	and	the	le-gitimation	of	unquestioned,	state-led	corporate	capitalism	(Boggs,	2000;	Crouch,	2011).	Contempo-rary	examples	of	post-political-induced	unrest	like	those	at	Zucotti	Park	and	Tahrir	Square	exempli-fy	 cathartic	 moments	 of	 democratic	 expression	 that	 oppose	 the	 ‘economization	 of	 everything’	(Brown,	 2015)	 which	 seems	 to	 characterize	 neoliberal	 political	 relations	 today.	 Wilson	 and	Swyngedouw	capture	this	defining	institutional	feature	of	post-political	life	well:		 Post-politics	 is	 defined	by	 the	 reduction	of	 the	political	 to	 the	 economic	–	 the	 creation	of	 a	‘welcoming	 business	 environment’,	 which	 inspires	 ‘investor	 confidence’,	 and	 provides	 the	economic	 guarantees	 deemed	 necessary	 for	 ‘strong	 and	 stable	markets’…[T]he	 economy	 is	therefore	increasingly	insulated	from	even	the	most	limited	forms	of	democratic	accountabil-ity,	even	as	the	state	increasingly	legitimizes	itself	in	terms	of	its	capacity	for	‘pragmatic’	and	‘responsible’	economic	management.		 (2014b,	p.	8-9)		Concerning	the	practices	of		macro-economic	governance,	post-political	‘pragmatism’	of	this	sort	is	now	 commonly	 achieved	 through	 state	 reliance	 on	 policy	 experts	 and	 so-called	 ‘best	 practices’	(Peck,	2011)	like	those	sought	via	neoliberalization.	This	is	an	increasingly	easy	task	for	states	like	Canada	where	austerity	 is	 the	new	normal	–	where	“the	elision	of	democracy	with	 the	dictates	of	capital”	 (Wilson	 and	 Swyngedouw,	 2014b,	 p.	 9)	 unequivocally	 equates	 sound	political	 leadership	with	economic	progress.	Of	course,	this	 is	not	a	new	phenomenon,	but	the	extent	to	which	it	now	constitutes	 a	 populist	 neoliberal	 ‘common-sense’	 (Springer,	 2013)	 arguably	 is.	 Indeed,	 the	 post-political	condition	is	so	disconcerting	largely	because	it	supplants	a	more	holistic	political	determi-nation,	both	for	citizens	and	varied	 ‘agents’	of	governance,	with	a	narrowly	focused	conception	of	economic	prosperity	as	the	true	democratic	ideal.	Environmental	issues	have	become	an	important	focus	of	post-political	critique	as	of	late	(Raco,	2014;	Swyngedouw,	2011,	2010,	2009),	and	these	framings	speak	to	the	challenges	faced	by	envi-
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ronmental	movements	in	light	of	unabated	neoliberal	capitalism	and	its	antagonism	with	the	poli-tics	of	 sustainability,	 or	environmental	 governance	more	broadly.	 Indeed,	Erik	Swyngedouw’s	 re-cent	work	on	eco-politics	and	climate	change	(2009,	2010)	is	particularly	informative	here.	He	ex-plores	how	the	“fetishization	of	CO2”	by	the	global	scientific	elite	and	their	co-optation	of	the	dis-course	of	 sustainability	has	 resulted	 in	a	unilateral,	quasi-apocalyptic	vision	of	neoliberal	 climate	politics	(2010,	p.	216).	Lamenting	the	loss	of	true	political	dialogue	about	alternatives	to	green	capi-talism	as	the	solution,	he	argues	that	“much	of	the	sustainability	argument	has	evacuated	the	poli-tics	of	the	possible,	 the	radical	contestation	of	alternative	future	socio-environmental	possibilities	and	socio-natural	arrangements,	and	has	silenced	the	antagonisms	and	conflicts	that	are	constitu-tive	of	our	socio-natural	orders	by	externalizing	conflict”	(2010,	p.	228).		Swyngedouw’s	main	argument	–	that	there	are,	in	fact,	alternatives	to	the	technocratic	solutions	realized	within	neoliberal	capitalism	for	the	challenges	presented	by	carboniferous	capitalism,	but	no	political	space	for	them	to	be	vocalized	–	is	intrinsic	of	the	post-political	context	I	will	relate	to	Canadian	water	governance.	More	specifically,	however,	I	seek	to	elucidate	a	political-economic	en-vironment	–	one	rich	with	 the	symbolism	and	practices	of	neoliberal	governance	–	 in	which	 local	governments	must	now	accept	that,	by	way	of	austere	rationalizations	of	fiscal	capacity,	the	federal	government	 now	 determines	 the	 conditions	 through	which	water	 services	 are	 to	 be	 provided	 to	their	citizens.	 Indeed,	a	post-politics	 is	at	play	 in	 the	Canadian	waterscape	 that	depoliticizes	 envi-ronmental	decision-making	at	the	local	level,	in	exchange	for	privatization.		
Neoliberal	Water	Privatization	
	 Like	many	other	aspects	of	the	public	realm,	the	neoliberalization	of	water	services	began	in	the	1980s.	 The	UK	was	 one	 of	 the	 first	 sites	 to	 experiment	with	 full	 asset	 privatization	 in	 1989	 (see	Bakker,	2004),	and	due	to	the	inclusion	of	privatization	schemes	in	the	infamous	Washington	Con-sensus	(Woods,	2006),	it	spread	quickly	through	the	Global	South	(Castro,	2008;	Prasad,	2006).	The	now-famous	events	at	Cochabamba,	Bolivia	is	a	fine	indication	of	the	reception	of	such	policies	dur-ing	this	period,	where	the	privatization	of	public	water	services	at	the	behest	of	the	World	Bank	re-sulted	in	wide-spread	protests	and	civil	unrest	(see	Spronk,	2007).		Although	water	privatization	began	 in	 the	UK	and	 spread	 southwards	 from	 there,	 other	 coun-tries	in	the	Global	North	were	not	immune	to	the	discursive	force	of	privatization.		Indeed,	the	so-called	‘state	failure’	rationale	gained	traction	through	the	80s	and	90s,	souring	the	idea	that	public	services	should	be	safe	from	marketization,	and	so	water	privatization	arrived	in	North	America	as	well.	As	Bakker	notes,	 this	perspective	 “posits	 that	 states	are	 less	efficient	and	effective	 than	pri-vate-sector	organizations	and	markets”	(2014,	p.	474).	This	discourse	echoes	the	pro-private	sen-timents	of	other	institutional	reforms	of	the	era,	like	New	Public	Management,	which	characterized	public	 services	 and	 decision-making	 processes	 to	 be	 inadequate	 for	 accommodating	 the	 spatial-temporal	conditions	of	economic	globalization.			
The	Canadian	Context	
	 	In	Canada,	where	public	 services	have	maintained	a	 strong	 legacy	 in	 the	 collective	 imaginary,	full	asset	privatization	has	not	been	as	successful	as	in	other	regions.	However,	service	privatization	(or	‘alternative	service	delivery’	(Furlong	and	Bakker,	2010))	has	become	an	increasingly	common	state-led	 solution	 for	 achieving	 the	 benefits	 of	 asset	 privatization	–	 namely,	 capital	 accumulation	(Harvey,	 2005)	–	 without	 the	 social	 ramifications	 experienced	 in	 places	 like	 Bolivia.	 The	 2005	Walkerton,	Ontario	 tragedy	exemplifies	 this	contextual	difference.	As	Prudham	(2004)	has	 identi-fied,	the	provincial	mandate	for	the	use	of	private	sector	actors	for	municipal	water	testing	resulted	in	a	failure	of	regulatory	oversight	–	a	so-called	‘normal	incident’	of	neoliberalism	–	that	caused	ex-tensive	poisoning	and	the	loss	of	life	for	citizens	in	the	Ontario	town.	Though	the	infrastructure	re-
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mained	public,	the	affiliated	testing	services	were	privatized,	signaling	that	privatization	need	not	involve	the	sale	of	assets,	simply	the	incorporation	of	the	norms	and	characteristics	of	marketiza-tion,	like	commodification	and	commercialization	(Bakker	2003).	Thus,	while	only	a	brief	example,	this	case	highlights	the	near-sightedness	of	regulatory	change	favouring	market-based	governance	practices	that	has	come	to	characterize	many	aspects	of	water	governance	in	Canada,	and	neoliber-alization	more	generally.	However,	one	would	be	hard-pressed	to	argue	that	Canadian	water	infrastructure	is	not	in	dire	need	of	investment	–	a	material	reality	that	has	stoked	the	flames		of	neoliberalization	under	analy-sis	 here.	 Indeed,	while	 public	 infrastructure	 has	 been	 underfunded	 for	 decades,	 it	 became	much	more	pronounced	between	the	mid-70s	and	mid-80s	(Mackenzie,	2013),	and	the	concomitance	of	this	with	the	rise	in	Canadian	deficit	politics,	of	‘low-tax’,	neoliberal	austerity	ideology	(Carroll	and	Little	2001),	should	not	be	ignored.	Nevertheless,	the	capital	shortcoming	is	still	monumental.	Mac-kenzie	(2013)	estimates	that	an	investment	totaling	30%	of	annual	GDP	is	needed	to	meet	demand.	Concerning	water	 infrastructure	 specifically,	 the	 Canadian	Water	 Network	 (CWN)	 determined	 in	2004	that	$39	billion	was	required	to	maintain	and	upgrade	existing	water	systems,	and	estimated	this	amount	would	reach	$90	billion	by	2013	(CWN,	2004).	Similarly,	 the	federal	government	has	estimated	that	water	infrastructure	costs	may	reach	a	staggering	$100	billion	by	2023	(PPP	Canada,	2013)–hence	the	‘need’	for	alternatives	to	public	provision.		
P3s	in	Canada	
	 The	infrastructure	funding	shortfall	represents	a	serious	liability	for	essential	services	like	water,	and	one	that	the	government	chose	to	remedy	through	privatization.	Indeed,	“since	1993,	the	Gov-ernment	of	Canada	has	attempted	to	address	the	infrastructure	deficit	through	a	series	of	shared-cost	programs”	(Dupuis	&	Ruffilli,	2011,	n.p)	in	hopes	of	dispersing	the	responsibility	for	providing	infrastructure	and	services	without	challenging	the	neoliberal	waterscape	in	Canada.	What’s	more,	this	 sentiment	 has	 also	 been	 embraced	 by	 numerous	 sub-federal	 governments.	 British	 Columbia	was	the	first	province	to	adopt	the	P3	approach,	stating	in	2003	that	“P3s	can	reduce	[the]	govern-ment’s	 capital	 costs,	helping	 to	bridge	 the	gap	between	 the	need	 for	 infrastructure	and	 the	Prov-ince's	financial	capacity”	(Partnerships	BC,	2003,	p.	3).	Since	then,	P3s	have	spread	to	virtually	eve-ry	Canadian	province	and	territory	(Loxley,	2010).	P3s	are	contractual	agreements	between	a	public	party	(typically	a	government)	and	a	private	firm	(or	conglomerate	of	firms),	whereby	the	latter	design,	build,	finance,	maintain,	or	operate	pub-lic	services	in	exchange	for	the	profit	generated	by	these	activities	(Loxley,	2010;	Whiteside,	2012).	This	arrangement	is	key,	because	with	ownership	remaining	public,	P3s	can	be	touted	by	the	state	as	a	public-owned,	low	risk	solution	to	funding	shortfalls	–	as	a	benefit	to	the	public	economic	good.	Indeed,	 the	argument	offered	by	 the	state	and	 their	corporate	 ideologues	 is	 that	because	govern-ments	retain	ownership	of	the	assets	in	question,	the	processes	involved	do	not	amount	to	privati-zation	(CCPPP/PPP	Canada,	2012),	however	this	is	simply	untrue.		While	the	focus	of	this	paper	is	not	to	present	a	detailed	critique	of	P3s,	it	must	be	stressed	that	P3s	do	not	achieve	the	public	benefits	for	which	their	use	is	politically	and	economically	 justified,	and	 that	 they	 are	most	 certainly	 a	 form	 of	 privatization	 (Mackenzie,	 2013;	Mehra,	 2005;	 Loxley,	2012,	 2010;	 Whiteside,	 2013;	 Vining	 and	 Boardman,	 2008;	 Ouyahia,	 2006).	 P3s	 epitomize	 the	commodification	and	privatization	of	public	services	in	Canada	(McBride	and	Whiteside,	2011),	and	characterize	neoliberal	accumulation	by	dispossession	in	all	its	destructive	glory	(Whiteside,	2009).	The	shortcomings	of	P3s	–	cost	and	time	overruns,	labour	code	violations,	decreased	quality	of	ser-vice	and	product	–	have	been	vocally	noted	by	academics	and	members	of	civil	society	 for	nearly	two	 decades	 (e.g.	 Council	 of	 Canadians,	 2012;	 CUPE,	 1998;	 Loxley,	 2010,	 2012;	Whiteside,	 2009,	2013).	In	point	of	fact,	global	trends	in	water	service	‘remunicipalization’	emphasize	these	findings,	and	challenge	the	privatization	of	public	water	altogether.	A	recent	study	completed	by	a	collective	
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of	civil	 society	organizations	documents	180	cases	of	water	privatization,	many	of	 them	P3s,	 that	have	 reverted	 to	 public	 provision	 (Lobina	 et	 al.,	 2014),	 therefore	 reaffirming	 the	 ‘uncooperative’	nature	of	private	water	management	overall	(Bakker,	2004).		Yet,	contrary	to	a	decade	of	critical	examination	and	evidence	indicating	that	privatization	is	not	compatible	with	water	services,	the	Canadian	state	eagerly	continues	to	institutionalize	P3s,	in	poli-cy	and	practice,	as	the	future	of	water	infrastructure	and	provision	in	Canada	(Lang,	2013).	Worry-ingly,	this	is	being	enacted	in	a	way	that	legitimizes	privatization	while	at	the	same	time	inhibits	the	capabilities	of	local	governments	to	oppose	its	institutionalization.	
	
The	Making	of	a	Post-Political,	Neoliberal	Waterscape	
							
The	Post-Politics	of	Austerity	
	 The	crisis	of	2008	served	as	a	catalyst	for	solidifying	the	Canadian	state’s	commitment	to	water	service	privatization.	While	it	was	purported	early	that	Canada	fared	well	in	its	recovery	from	the	recession,	the	crisis	certainly	crossed	the	border.	As	McBride	and	Whiteside	(2011)	note,	the	initial	monetary	response	to	the	crisis	was	denial,	and	then	minimization,	as	the	Conservative	government	sought	 to	uphold	 the	 image	of	an	economy	 that	had	survived	relatively	unscathed	because	of	 the	stability	of	its	banking	sector.	Yet,	the	monetary	actions	of	the	state	indicate	a	contradictory	condi-tion,	 evidenced	 by	 the	 somewhat	 quiet	 distribution	 of	 a	 significant	 bailout	 package	 estimated	 at	$114	Billion	by	the	end	of	2010	(Macdonald,	2012).		This	 aligns	with	 the	 post-political	 naturalization	 of	 economic	 emergency	 as	 a	 stable	 fixture	 of	contemporary	states,	 in	which	“our	societies	must	no	 longer	be	concerned	with	the	fight	 for	 free-dom	or	 equality…	but	with	 the	 struggle	 for	 survival”	 (Rancière	 2010,	 p.	 18,	 as	 cited	 in	Wilson	&	Swyngedouw,	2014a).	Of	course,	the	survival	in	question	is	that	of	the	economy,	not	of	public	ser-vices,	 and	hard	 times	 call	 for	 hard	measures;	 so	 should	 the	 state	 (and	 its	 stakeholders)	 be	ques-tioned	as	to	why	they	are	endorsing	P3s	so	eagerly,	the	ideological	weight	of	the	economic	survival	discourse	will	surely	ease	the	burden	of	justifying	a	policy	directive	that	endorses	water	privatiza-tion.	The	 2012	C-38	 budget	 provides	 an	 insightful	 look	 at	 the	 neoliberal	 discourse	 used	 to	 enforce	austerity	 following	 the	 crisis.	 For	 example,	 the	 federal	 government	 stated	 in	 2012	 that	 it	 was	“committed	to	returning	to	balanced	budgets	at	an	appropriate	pace	as	the	economy	continues	to	recover	from	the	global	economic	crisis”	(Government	of	Canada,	2012,	p.	209).	While	this	directive	is	not	surprising,	it	is	distinctly	inconsistent	with	economic	conditions	at	that	time,	because	by	2012	the	Canadian	economy	had	not	depressed	 to	 the	 same	extent	 as	other	 large	 economies	 (McBride	and	Whiteside,	2011).	In	fact,	it	was	reported	in	the	same	budget	document	that,	because	of	Cana-da’s	 “sound	 economic,	 fiscal	 and	 financial	 sector	 fundamentals,	 real	 GDP	 [wa]s…	well	 above	 pre-recession	 levels	–	 the	best	performance	 in	the	G-7”	(Government	of	Canada,	2012,	p.	32).	Yet,	 the	Canadian	state	still	pushed	austerity	forwards,	‘tightening	the	belt’	by	cutting	public	spending	in	its	attempt	to	balance	the	budget.	As	MacDonald	(2012)	notes,	the	spending	cuts	required	to	return	to	balance	were	 immense,	 as	 the	2012	bill	 included	public	 sector	 job	 cuts	projected	 to	 total	 34,000	federal	 jobs	 by	 2015.	 With	 additional	 changes	 to	 employment	 insurance	 and	 old	 age	 security,	amongst	numerous	others,	C-38	was	described	as	Canada’s	“austerity	budget	wonderland”	(Broad,	2012,	n.p.),	rife	with	tales	of	good-doing	though	indicative	of	severe	structural	economic	change.		Perhaps	unsurprisingly,	this	was	the	same	budget	year	that	P3s	became	a	direct	avenue	of	public	investment.	The	newly	established	Community	 Infrastructure	 Improvement	Fund	dedicated	$150	million	 to	 local	 infrastructure	projects,	 to	 be	prioritized	 “through	 consultation	with	partners	 and	stakeholders”	in	the	private	sector	(Government	of	Canada,	2012,	p.	156).	Here,	another	element	of	post-political	governance	comes	to	light,	namely	how	state-level	politics	occurs	in	unison	with	eco-nomic	deliberation,	within	an	“unquestioned	framework”	of	 free-market	economics,	and	all	 in	the	
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‘public	 interest’	(Wilson	and	Swyngedouw,	2014b,	p.	8).	Though,	as	recent	history	has	shown,	the	economic	bailouts	 following	 the	Great	Recession	were	made	on	the	backs	of	the	public,	 and	 in	 the	interest	of	the	capitalist	class.	As	such,	socially	or	environmentally-minded	alternatives	to	bailouts	and	austerity	 	can	not	reach	beyond	rhetoric	and	dismissal	when	‘recovery	from	crisis’	 is	the	sole	prerogative	of	the	state.	Therefore,	neoliberalization	was	 left	unquestioned	in	Canada,	thus	acting	to	depoliticize	the	economy	as	a	separate	institution	deserving	of	democratic,	agonistic,	political	at-tention,	and	instead	to	‘embed’	it	in	the	political	(Polanyi,	2001).	Taken	in	sum,	this	account	exem-plifies	the	‘irrational	rationality’	of	neoliberal	economic	reforms	(Brown,	2015)	pursued	in	Canada	during	a	period	when	such	drastic	measures	were	not	necessary.	More	so,	 it	 indicates	the	reifica-tion	of	the	post-political	foundation–	where	austerity	is	acceptable,	or	perhaps	even	necessary,	for	selling	the	P3	privatization	agenda.		
	
Entrenching	Private	Stakeholder	Interests:	From	‘Government’	to	‘Governance’	
	 Since	 the	 crisis	 of	 2008,	 numerous	 government	 agencies	 have	 been	 formed	 or	 repurposed	 in	Canada	 that	 form	a	policy	 infrastructure	which	 supports	 the	development	 of	 public-private	part-nerships.	These	entities	exist	at	both	the	federal	and	provincial	level,	and,	in	accordance	with	asso-ciated	 budgetary	 allocations	 and	 other	 financial	 abilities,	 help	 to	 further	 institutionalize	 the	 P3	model	and	promulgate	its	use.		The	main	advocate	in	the	federal	push	for	P3s	is	Public-Private	Partnerships	(PPP)	Canada.	PPP	Canada	 is	 a	Crown	Corporation,	 and	 is	 therefore	wholly	 owned	by	 the	Federal	Government.	This	ownership	structure	is	important,	because	the	entity	acts	both	as	an	auxiliary	government	agency	and	as	a	political	 tool,	 as	 it	 is	 responsible	 for	both	promoting	P3s	 in	Canada	and	assessing	 infra-structure	and	service	compatibility	with	the	P3	model.	This	dual	authority	is	discussed	in	a	recent	annual	report,	which	notes	that	PPP	Canada	(2012a,	n.p.)	was	created	“to	deliver	more	P3s	by	lev-eraging	 incentives,	 demonstrating	 success,	 providing	 expertise;	 and	 to	deliver	 better	P3s	by	pro-moting	procurement	options	analysis,	and	capacity	building”.	As	the	agency	further	acknowledges,	“the	twin	challenges	of	returning	to	fiscal	balance	and	promoting	private	sector	led	economic	and	job	growth	are	the	dominant	public	policy	priorities	of	governments	across	Canada	and	around	the	world.	Public-Private	Partnerships	(P3s)	have	demonstrated	their	ability	to	contribute	to	these	pri-orities”	(PPP	Canada,	2012a,	p.	1).	Indeed,	PPP	Canada	is	very	clear	in	its	allegiance	to	private	infra-structure	provision,	noting	 that	 the	preferred	P3	model	 is	 that	which	offers	best	value	 for	money	and	 “the	most	private	 sector	 involvement”	 (PPP	Canada,	2012a,	p.	1).	Following	 the	 formation	of	PPP	Canada,	similar	agencies	have	been	created	or	adapted	at	the	provincial	level	as	well.	In	all,	six	provinces	have	committed	resources	of	varying	capacity	to	the	creation	of	sub-federal	P3	markets	in	Canada.	British	Columbia,	 for	 example,	 is	 the	national	 leader,	 having	 run	a	dedicated	agency	 –	Partnerships	BC	–	since	2002,	while	Partnerships	New	Brunswick	was	only	recently	established	in	2012.		From	a	post-political	 standpoint,	 establishing	 these	 ‘P3	units’3	 in	 the	years	 following	 the	crisis	has	allowed	the	Canadian	state	to	capitalize	on	the	aforementioned	neoliberal	climate	of	austerity	to	 include	 a	 new	 cadre	 of	 private	 stakeholders	 in	 the	 mechanisms	 of	 water	 governance.	 As	Swyngedouw	reminds	us,	echoing	Rancière,	“postpolitics	is	[…]	about	the	administration	(policing)	of	 environmental,	 social,	 economic	 or	 other	domains	 and	 they	 remain,	 of	 course,	 fully	within	 the	realm	of	the	possible,	of	existing	social	relations;	they	are	 ‘the	partition	of	the	sensible’”	(2009,	p.	609)	–	 and	who	better	 to	 administer	 the	 apparatus	 responsible	 for	 resolving	 the	 country’s	 infra-structure	 needs	 than	 representatives	 of	 corporate	 capital,	 the	 ‘sensible’	 advocates	 of	 economic	growth?	 Thus,	 unsurprisingly,	 the	 PPP	 Canada	 board	 of	 directors	 consists	 of	 current	 or	 former	members	of	BMO	Financial,	KPMG,	and	SNC-Lavalin,	all	firms	that	are	set	to	profit	from	expanding	the	P3	industry	in	Canada.	While	such	corporate-state	elite	relations	are	not	new	(e.g.	Mills,	1956),	those	exposed	here	act	to	remove	the	‘partition’	between	private	and	public	service;	between	cor-
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poration	 and	 state;	 between	 reductionist	 governance	 towards	 economic	 growth	 and	 democratic	political	decision-making	–	and	create	the	space	for	privatization	to	expand	with	little	resistance.		
	
	
From	‘Politics’	to	‘Policies’:	Privately	Financing	Municipal	Water	Services	
		 We	 can	 also	 observe	 in	 the	 Canadian	waterscape	 the	 creeping	 normality	 of	 an	 infrastructure	funding	policy	structure	that	entrenches	the	P3	method.	Before	the	crisis,	Federal	funds	were	more	readily	available	 for	needy	 local	governments.	For	example,	 the	$8.8	billion	Building	Canada	Fund	was	 created	 in	 2007	 to	 support	 national,	 provincial,	 and	municipal	 infrastructure	 projects	 under	very	lax	restrictions,	primarily	focusing	on	projects	that	supported	three	core	foci:	economic	devel-opment,	 environmental	 protection,	 and	 community	 prosperity	 (Infrastructure	 Canada,	 2011).	 In	recent	years,	however,	infrastructure	funding	policy	has	been	reformed,	limiting	the	accessibility	of	money	 for	municipalities	 and	 therefore	necessitating	 the	use	of	public-private	partnerships,	with	focused	attention	on	water	services.		Indeed,	 recent	 Federal	 budgets	 have	 introduced	policy	 that	 ‘routinizes’	 (Whiteside,	 2013)	 P3s	within	 the	 interscalar	 economics	 of	 development	 in	 Canada.	 The	 state	 introduced	 the	P3	Canada	
Fund	in	2009,	dedicating	$1.25	billion	in	available	support	for	sub-national	infrastructure	projects,	up	to	25%	of	a	project’s	direct	capital	costs.	To	be	eligible	for	this	financial	support,	however,	pro-jects	must	be	procured	as	a	P3.	The	2013	federal	budget	refilled	this	fund	with	an	additional	$1.25	billion	over	5	years;	however,	access	was	predicated	on	some	significant	new	conditions.	Now,	all	applications	with	a	value	above	$100	billion	are	subject	to	a	‘P3	screen.’	This	mandatory	screen	in-cludes	a	 “rigorous	quantitative	and	 financial	analysis	 to	determine	whether	a	P3	approach	would	provide	better	value	for	money	than	a	traditional	procurement	approach”	(Government	of	Canada,	2013,	p.	177).	Essentially,	 any	and	all	projects	 seeking	 federal	 support	must	prove	 their	project’s	feasibility	for	accommodating	the	P3	model4.	When	keeping	in	mind	that	PPP	Canada	is	responsible	for	determining	the	worthiness	applications	by	assessing	their	amenability	to	P3	privatization,	little	room	is	left	for	deliberation	should	a	municipal	government	not	want	to	privatize.		Finally,	what	 is	most	disconcerting	about	 these	depoliticized	conditions	of	privatization	 is	 that	water	services	are	now	a	leading	priority	for	P3	expansion	in	Canada.	This	is	evidenced	by	two	re-cent	interrelated	policy	changes.	First,	PPP	Canada	now	explicitly	states	that	water	services	are	best	suited	 for	 the	most	 intense	 form	of	privatization	–	 the	DBFOM,	or	 ‘Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Maintain’	model	–	and	emphasized	that	applications	should	fit	this	model	in	order	to	receive	federal	funding	(PPP	Canada,	2014).	Importantly,	of	those	water	sector	P3s	funded	since	2008,	five	of	eight	have	been	this	type,	which	often	include	contracts	of	up	to	30	years	and	little	recourse	for	reversal	(Lang,	2013).	Second,	and	perhaps	most	significant,	PPP	Canada	recently	emphasized	that	the	poli-cy	pertaining	to	the	project	value	at	which	a	P3	Screen	is	necessary–	now	set	at	$100	million	–	will	not	apply	to	the	water	and	wastewater	sectors,	and	that	all	water	sector	P3s	will	be	eligible.	Specifi-cally,	 PPP	 Canada	 (2013)	 emphasized	 that	 this	 minimum	 project	 value	 “is	 not	 firm,	 is	 project-specific	and	may	be	less	relevant	to	the	water/wastewater	sector	than	other	infrastructure	sectors	due	to	 the	nature	of	 the	market	of	service	providers”	(p.	4).	Though	 it	 likely	goes	without	saying,	these	‘providers’	are	private,	for-profit	firms.	The	report	also	notes	that	small	projects	of	between	$10-30	million	are	the	norm	for	the	water	sector,	and	therefore,	that	these	projects	will	be	consid-ered	 for	 funding	 and	 endorsed	 by	 the	 government	 regardless	 of	 other	 overarching	 policies	 (PPP	Canada,	2013).		Taken	together,	these	policy	changes	indicate	that	the	federal	government	is	now	strongly	com-mitted	to	privatizing	municipal	water	services	in	Canada.	Of	course,	one	might	argue	that	this	activ-ity	 is	simply	a	response	to	the	aforementioned	water	infrastructure	deficit;	an	attempt	to	channel	investment	to	development	at	a	time	when	the	public	coffers	are	short.	This	may	be	a	valid	argu-ment,	if	not	for	the	fact	that	it	ignores	the	neoliberalization	of	public	services	that	has	occurred	over	
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the	past	three	decades;	that	it	neglects	the	political	determination	that	has	created	this	state	of	low-tax,	economic	scarcity	in	the	first	place	(Dobbins,	1998;	Carroll	and	Shaw,	2001;	Evans,	2008).	Yet,	with	a	closer	look,	we	can	see	the	contradictions	of	post-political	governance	also	shining	through.	While	P3s	are	actively	promoted	by	the	state	as	a	mechanism	to	meet	the	growing	demand	of	aging	infrastructure	 in	Canada	without	 selling	 the	 asset,	 as	was	 the	 case	with	Crown	Corporations,	 the	political	 autonomy	 of	 local	 governments	 is	 nevertheless	 usurped	 through	 a	 policy	 structure	 that	removes	their	ability	for	decision-making	and	hands	it	to	agencies	such	as	PPP	Canada,	whose	in-terests	and	mandate	eschew	public	delivery.	What	remains	is	a	waterscape	destabilized	by	the	post-political	conflation	of	the	austere	priorities	of	state-directed,	yet	corporate-led	governance	and	the	necessarily	autonomous	politics	of	local	development.	This	presents	a	troubling	forecast	for	water	governance	in	Canada,	on	which	I	will	offer	some	brief	reflections.	
	
Conclusion	
	 Growing	attention	 to	 ‘local’	water	 governance	practices	 in	 recent	decades	has	 emphasized	 the	benefits	of	local	decision-making	in	resource	management	(Wismer	and	Mitchell,	2005).	However,	as	this	research	indicates,	the	assumed	benefits	of	participation	in	environmental	governance	–	in-cluding	 the	 sharing	 “of	 information,	 understanding,	 and	 the	 capacity	 for	 change”	 (Wisner	 and	Mitchell,	2005,	p.	1)	–	are	significantly	limited	when	local	governments,	in	this	case,	municipalities,	cannot	make	 the	most	 suitable	 decisions	 regarding	 how	 to	 finance	 or	 provide	 the	 infrastructure	needed	for	managing	these	resources.	Unfortunately,	these	findings	are	in	line	with	those	offered	by	others	studies	like	those	conducted	by	Norman	and	Bakker	(2008)	and	Parsons	(2001),	who	have	found	 that	 the	 ‘scaling	down’	of	environmental	governance	 in	Canada	does	not	always	mean	 that	political	authority	will	follow.	The	research	at	hand	indicates	that	the	state,	via	it’s	affiliated	quasi-private	agencies,	still	plays	a	very	large	role	in	managing	the	economic	capabilities	of	local	govern-ments	via	their	water	services.		Indeed,	this	analysis	illuminates	a	waterscape	where	future	management	practices	may	be	dom-inated	 by	 stakeholders	 who	 view	 water	 services	 as	 economic	 practices,	 first	 and	 foremost,	 and	therefore	craft	policy	that	commodifies	water	from	the	Federal	level	downwards.	In	Raco’s	terms,	it	reflects	a	‘false	managerial	utopianism’	in	which	“common-sense	understandings	of	democracy	and	decision-making	processes	are	thus	being	eroded	piece	by	piece”	through	“new	modes	of	depend-ency	on	experts”	 (2014,	p.	43)	 like	PPP	Canada	and	 the	CCPPP.	When	coupled	with	 the	dogmatic	normalization	of	neoliberal	austerity,	the	political	climate	in	Canada	leaves	little	space	for	contesta-tion,	while	concomitantly	opening	up	space	 for	the	spatio-temporal	displacement	of	private	capital	(Harvey,	2001).	Municipal	governments	are	left	without	the	political	capacity	to	make	effective	de-cisions	about	how	to	manage	 their	water	services,	and	potentially	 their	social	and	environmental	responsibilities	as	community	leaders.	The	ability	to	make	choices	concerning	local	tender,	employ-ing	 unionized	 labour,	 or	 adhering	 to	 ecologically	 specific	 practices	 could	 therefore	 be	 challenged	when	the	investment	needed	for	unavoidable	infrastructure	or	services	is	predicated	on	the	adop-tion	of	business	practices,	rooted	in	the	logic	of	capital	accumulation,	that	are	now	‘afforded’	via	P3	privatization.	Following	Swyngedouw	(2010),	 this	waterscape	now	mirrors	the	“postpoliticization	of	 the	 [local]	 public	 sphere	 (in	 parallel	 and	 intertwined	with	 the	 processes	 of	 neoliberalization)”	(215),	 but	 a	 contradictory	 public	 sphere	 that	 is	 committed–	 at	 least	 discursively	–	 to	 remaining	‘public’	if	only	in	name.	It	is	certainly	more	private	in	expression.	Luckily,	alternative	voices	can	still	be	heard,	echoing	from	places	where	privatization	has	not	unraveled	as	smoothly.	For	example,	in	2011	the	communities	of	Abbotsford	and	Mission,	BC	voted	to	oppose	federal	P3	funding	for	a	new	water	system	(Council	of	Canadians,	2011).	This	initiative,	led	by	Water	Watch	Mission-Abbotsford,	demonstrated	the	capabilities	of	local,	grassroots	opposition	in	responding	to	water	commodifica-tion.	However,	this	case	lies	in	the	minority,	and	more	awareness	of	P3s	is	needed	to	stem	the	tide	of	privatization	currently	swelling	in	Canada.		
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Finally,	 while	 stating	water’s	 importance	 is	 axiomatic,	 highlighting	 its	 essentiality	 is	 arguably	necessary	 for	 drawing	 attention	 to	 how	 sustainable	 management	 is	 an	 ongoing,	 global	 concern.	Thus,	 this	 task	might	be	 aided	 through	 recognition	of	water’s	 ‘post-sovereign’	 importance,	 a	 lens	which	reminds	us	that	“some	environmental	problems	lie	beyond	the	limits	of	ordinary	state	com-petence,	too	complex	to	be	resolved	through	straightforward	exercises	of	state	sovereignty	or	con-ventional	 inter-sovereign	agreements”	 (Karkainnen,	2004,	p.	74),	and	requiring	 inter-national	 co-operation.	However,	attention	must	be	paid	to	not	allowing	governance	practices	at	any	scale	to	be	co-opted	by	stakeholders	whose	interests	in	water	are	neoliberal	and	post-political.	Indeed,	our	de-pendence	on	water	is	pre-political,	and	requires	an	approach	to	water	management,	to	‘water	poli-tics’	in	general,	that	doesn’t	lose	site	of	this	fundamental	quality.	
	
Notes		1.	This	is	of	course	just	one	side	of	the	neoliberal	coin.	For	a	detailed	survey	of	how	this	word	is	cast	in	contemporary	critical	research,	see	Springer	et	al.	(2016).	2.	It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 there	 is	a	divide	 in	 the	post-politics	 literature	between	applications	rooted	in	these	ontological	foundations	(e.g.	Rancière,	1999)	and	those	that	seek	to	analyze	the	so-ciopolitical	 processes	 through	which	 this	 ontology	 is	 reified	 (e.g.	 Raco,	 2014).	 This	 paper	 aligns	with	the	latter.	3.	Political	economist	Heather	Whiteside	refers	to	the	agencies	involved	Canadian	P3s	as	‘P3	Units,’	arguing	that	they	are	responsible	for	the	‘routinization,	institutionalization,	and	depoliticization’	of	P3	policy	in	Canada	(2013).	4.	The	Federal	Government	announced	 in	November,	2015	 that	 this	 requirement	would	be	 lifted;	however,	 so	 far	 no	 indication	 of	 this	 is	 available	 from	official	 government	 sources.	 See	McKenna	(2015)	for	more	information.		
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